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Davis has raised several objections to our research strategy
which, he feels, has led us to largely null findings. While we wish
to respond to the criticisms of the strategy in some detail, we
find it important to argue first that his view of the findings
simply misses too much.’
It seems wrong to us to conclude that communication
variables had no effect on voters’ responses to the 1974
elections. Reading about the Senate hearings in newspapers and
magazines and discussing them with friends produced several
important consequences. To be sure, these consequences are
quite often different for the two age groups studied. But we see
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no reason to be either disturbed or embarrassed by these
conclusions as Davis seems to think we should be. Watergate
may not have had the massive effects some thought it would.
But our data suggest that Watergate did have an effect, and the
media played a prominent role in determining some of it.
Our findings are null, by and large, where television and radio
exposure is concerned. While we have acknowledged the
possibility of various explanations for this finding, other than
that of no relationship, and recognize the error of accepting the
null position, we feel the critic’s explanations merit serious
challenge. It is his position, as we understand it, that our null
fi nd i ngs may resu It from ou r strategy, wh ich he j udges to be too
conservative and lacking in creativity.
We do not see, quite simply, our research as the direct lineal
descendant of the early Columbia studies. Our program of
research, we feel, has tried to reexamine (e.g., Blumler and
McLeod, 1974; McLeod, Becker, and Byrnes, 1974; McLeod
and Becker, 1974; McLeod and Brown, 1975) many of the
conclusions attributed to the Columbia scholars. We see
ourselves as proponents of neither the limited effects position
nor the massive effects model. Rather, our research has
attempted to seek a middle ground where the characteristics of
audience members and the media content interact to produce
meaningful consequences. In the case of our agenda-setting
research, for example, we have argued that our findings suggest
neither massive cogn itive effects of the agenda-setti ng nature
nor total lack of effects (McLeod, Becker, and Byrnes, 1974).
Rather, the evidence indicates that the newspaper’s agenda
seemed to have consequences for particular types of people
under some specified circumstances. We are disturbed by the
fact that the complexities of those findings have tended to be
ignored both by adherents of the universality of agenda-setting
and by those who prefer to interpret them as null findings..
Davis argues that our strategy for examining effects is too
conservative, in part, because we have sought to control out
various prior influences. He is particularly concerned with the
influences of social structure on media use. By controlling for
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social structure, he argues, we might miss important media
consequences. We do not accept his contention that we have
controlled for such social-structural forces here; we also feel
uncomfortable with his position that researchers should not do
SO.’ If media effects are of any consequence, we feel, they must
be strong enough to withstand relevant controls. I n fact, in at
least one case where we applied rather rigorous controls for
social structure, the media withstood them (Blumler and
McLeod, 1974). The critic may be too protective of the media
variables.
Davis seems to have an underlying concern that communica-
tion researchers must justify their activities in terms of strong
media effects. Such a concern, of course, could lead us to
analysis stances which, while generally guaranteeing effects,
would not withstand serious theoretical and methodological
challenges. While we accept the critic’s call for more creativity
in looking for effects, we have opted to do so by increasing the
sample frame of relevant independent and dependent varibles.
Our study here, for example has included gratification measures
in an effort to expand the horizon of media variables and such
variables as turnout and campaign activity to increase the range
of possible effects. We reject the notion, however, that such
creativity should lead us away from the methodological rigor we
now have in the field. We opt to continue to borrow
methodological tools from our parent disciplines while challeng-
ing their conceptual narrowness.
Davis has suggested a strategy, which he is exploring. From
what he has told us here, it appears exciting on several counts.
We are in complete agreement with his contention that the
media may operate under certain contingencies which research-
ers need to explore fully. Our partition of the sample according
to age was such an effort, and one which we feel was rewarding.
The young showed a clearly different pattern of effects than the
older voters. Our efforts along this line have been hampered by
small sample sizes, but we recogn ize the merits of the approach.
We do not find it conflicting with what we have done here.
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We think Davis has ignored an important element of our
research. Our perspective in this particular problem has been
shaped to a considerable degree by the popular notion that
Watergate was having massive and perhaps unprecedented
effects on the political system. The media were assumed to play
a crucial role in this transformation. We began with the desire to
test this popular position, and our strategy and findings must be
considered in this light. We think our data show no strong case
for massive effects. But we believe our results do indicate that
the media did play some role in determining reactions to the
scandals. We would like to think that careful readers will agree
that our conclusions have added both to an understanding of
what happened during the Watergate period and to the body of
theory in our field. ,
NOTES
1. While our comments here reflect our continuing disagreement with Davis, we
would like to acknowledge the helpful suggestions he made regarding an earlier
version of this paper. We think this manuscript is a stronger one because of those
comments.
2. We controlled for only three types of variables here: prior levels of the
dependent variable in order to study change rather than level, party affiliation so as
to control for the greater Watergate communication avidity of Nixon-haters, and
usual patterns of communication so that we could evaluate the specific increment of
Watergate attention. Only the first of these proved to be important in accounting for
large proportions of variance. None of these controls are enduring social-structural
properties such as social class. The topic of the appropriateness of controls under
various situations is too complex to discuss completely here. However, we do not
argue that social-structural controls are relevant in all cases, but in many cases they
would be. Education would be an obvious control for spuriousness, for example, if
we found a zero-order relationship between media exposure and the kinds of
knowledge that might have been acquired previously in the classroom. Similarly, we
might control for education or other measures of stratification if we found a
connection between communication behavior and criteria depending upon self-report
measures prone to produce socially acceptable responses among the more sensitive,
"well-educated," middle-class respondents (e.g., racial attitude measures).
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